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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-636
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FORT GRATIOT SANITARY LANDFILL, INC.,
PETITIONER v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT
OF NATURAL RESOURCES et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the sixth circuit
[June 1, 1992]

  Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
  In Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617, 618 (1978),
we held that a New Jersey law prohibiting the importation
of most -`solid or liquid waste which originated or was
collected outside the territorial limits of the State'- violated
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.  In
this case petitioner challenges a Michigan law that prohib-
its private landfill operators from accepting solid waste that
originates outside the county in which their facilities are
located.  Adhering to our holding in the New Jersey case, we
conclude that this Michigan statute is also unconstitutional.
                            I
  In 1978 Michigan enacted its Solid Waste Management
Act (SWMA).  That Act required every Michigan county to
estimate the amount of solid waste that would be generated
in the county in the next 20 years and to adopt a plan
providing for its disposal at facilities that comply with state
health standards.  Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 299.425 (Supp.
1991).   After  holding  public  hearings  and  obtaining  the
necessary approval of municipalities in the county, as well
as the approval of the Director of the Michigan Department
of Natural Resources, the County Board of Commissioners
adopted a solid waste management plan for St. Clair
County.  In 1987 the Michigan Department of Natural
Resources issued a permit to petitioner to operate a
sanitary landfill as a solid waste disposal area in St. Clair
County.  See Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc. v. Michigan
Dept. of Natural Resources, 931 F. 2d 413, 414 (CA6 1991).
  On December 28, 1988, the Michigan Legislature amend-
ed the SWMA by adopting two provisions concerning the
-acceptance of waste or ash generated outside the county of
disposal area,- see 1988 Mich. Pub. Acts, No. 475, 1,
codified as amended, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 299.413a,
299.430(2) (Supp. 1991).  Those amendments (Waste Import
Restrictions), which became effective immediately, provide:
-A person shall not accept for disposal solid waste . . .
that is not generated in the county in which the
disposal area is located unless the acceptance of solid
waste . . . that is not generated in the county is explic-
itly authorized in the approved county solid waste
management plan.-  299.413a.

-In order for a disposal area to serve the disposal needs
of another county, state, or country, the service . . .
must be explicitly authorized in the approved solid
waste management plan of the receiving county.-
299.430(2).
  In February, 1989, petitioner submitted an application to
the St. Clair County Solid Waste Planning Committee for
authority to accept up to 1,750 tons per day of out-of-state
waste at its landfill.  See Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc. v.
Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, 732 F. Supp. 761, 762
(ED Mich. 1990).  In that application petitioner promised to
reserve sufficient capacity to dispose of all solid waste
generated in the county in the next 20 years.  The planning
committee denied the application.  Ibid.  In view of the fact
that the county's management plan does not authorize the
acceptance of any out-of-county waste, the Waste Import
Restrictions in the 1988 statute effectively prevent petition-
er from receiving any solid waste that does not originate in
St. Clair County.
  Petitioner therefore commenced this action seeking a
judgment declaring the Waste Import Restrictions unconsti-
tutional and enjoining their enforcement.  Petitioner
contended that requiring a private landfill operator to limit
its business to the acceptance of local waste constituted
impermissible discrimination against interstate commerce.
The District Court denied petitioner's motion for summary
judgment, however, 732 F. Supp., at 766, and subsequently
dismissed the complaint, App. 4.  The court first concluded
that the statute does not discriminate against interstate
commerce -on its face- because the import restrictions apply
-equally to Michigan counties outside of the county adopting
the plan as well as to out-of-state entities.-  732 F. Supp.,
at 764.  It also concluded that there was no discrimination
-in practical effect- because each county was given discre-
tion to accept out-of-state waste.  Ibid.  Moreover, the
incidental effect on interstate commerce was -not clearly
excessive in relation to the [public health and environmen-
tal] benefits derived by Michigan from the statute.-  Id., at
765.
  The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed with
the District Court's analysis.  Although it recognized that
the statute -places in-county and out-of-county waste in
separate categories,- the Court of Appeals found no discrim-
ination against interstate commerce because the statute
-does not treat out-of-county waste from Michigan any
differently than waste from other states.-  931 F. 2d, at 417.
It also agreed that there was no actual discrimination
because petitioner had not alleged that all counties in
Michigan ban out-of-state waste.  Id., at 418.  Accordingly,
it affirmed the judgment of the District Court.  Ibid.  We
granted certiorari, 502 U. S. ___ (1992), because of concern
that the decision below was inconsistent with Philadelphia
v. New Jersey, and now reverse.
                           II
  Before discussing the rather narrow issue that is contest-
ed, it is appropriate to identify certain matters that are not
in dispute.  Michigan's comprehensive program of regulat-
ing the collection, transportation, and disposal of solid
waste, as it was enacted in 1978 and administered prior to
the 1988 Waste Import Restrictions, is not challenged.  No
issue relating to hazardous waste is presented, and there is
no claim that petitioner's operation violated any health,
safety, or sanitation requirement.  Nor does the case raise
any question concerning policies that municipalities or
other governmental agencies may pursue in the manage-
ment of publicly owned facilities.  The case involves only
the validity of the Waste Import Restrictions as they apply
to privately owned and operated landfills.
  On the other hand, Philadelphia v. New Jersey provides
the framework for our analysis of this case.  Solid waste,
even if it has no value, is an article of commerce.  437
U. S., at 622-623.  Whether the business arrangements
between out-of-state generators of waste and the Michigan
operator of a waste disposal site are viewed as -sales- of
garbage or -purchases- of transportation and disposal
services, the commercial transactions unquestionably have
an interstate character.  The Commerce Clause thus
imposes some constraints on Michigan's ability to regulate
these transactions.
  As we have long recognized, the -negative- or -dormant-
aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits States from
-advanc[ing] their own commercial interests by curtailing
the movement of articles of commerce, either into or out of
the state.-  H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U. S.
525, 535 (1949).  A state statute that clearly discriminates
against interstate commerce is therefore unconstitutional
-unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a
valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism.-  New
Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269, 274
(1988).
  New Jersey's prohibition on the importation of solid
waste failed this test:
-[T]he evil of protectionism can reside in legislative
means as well as legislative ends.  Thus, it does not
matter whether the ultimate aim of ch. 363 is to reduce
the waste disposal costs of New Jersey residents or to
save remaining open lands from pollution, for we
assume New Jersey has every right to protect its
residents' pocketbooks as well as their environment.
And it may be assumed as well that New Jersey may
pursue those ends by slowing the flow of all waste into
the State's remaining landfills, even though interstate
commerce may incidentally be affected.  But whatever
New Jersey's ultimate purpose, it may not be accompa-
nied by discriminating against articles of commerce
coming from outside the State unless there is some
reason, apart from their origin, to treat them different-
ly.  Both on its face and in its plain effect, ch. 363
violates this principle of nondiscrimination.

      -The Court has consistently found parochial legisla-
tion of this kind to be constitutionally invalid, whether
the ultimate aim of the legislation was to assure a
steady supply of milk by erecting barriers to allegedly
ruinous outside competition, Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig,
Inc., 294 U. S., at 522-524; or to create jobs by keeping
industry within the State, Foster-Fountain Packing Co.
v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 1, 10; Johnson v. Haydel, 278 U. S.
16; Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S., at 403-404; or to
preserve the State's financial resources from depletion
by fencing out indigent immigrants, Edwards v.
California, 314 U. S. 160, 173-174.  In each of these
cases, a presumably legitimate goal was sought to be
achieved by the illegitimate means of isolating the
State from the national economy.-  Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U. S., at 626-627.
  The Waste Import Restrictions enacted by Michigan
authorize each of its 83 counties to isolate itself from the
national economy.  Indeed, unless a county acts affirmative-
ly to permit other waste to enter its jurisdiction, the statute
affords local waste producers complete protection from
competition from out-of-state waste producers who seek to
use local waste disposal areas.  In view of the fact that
Michigan has not identified any reason, apart from its
origin, why solid waste coming from outside the county
should be treated differently from solid waste within the
county, the foregoing reasoning would appear to control the
disposition of this case.
                           III
  Respondents Michigan and St. Clair County argue,
however, that the Waste Import Restrictions-unlike the
New Jersey prohibition on the importation of solid
waste-do not discriminate against interstate commerce on
their face or in effect because they treat waste from other
Michigan counties no differently than waste from other
States.  Instead, respondents maintain, the statute regu-
lates evenhandedly to effectuate local interests and should
be upheld because the burden on interstate commerce is not
clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits.  Cf. Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970).  We
disagree, for our prior cases teach that a State (or one of its
political subdivisions) may not avoid the strictures of the
Commerce Clause by curtailing the movement of articles of
commerce through subdivisions of the State, rather than
through the State itself.
  In Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78 (1891), we reviewed
the constitutionality of a Virginia statute that imposed
special inspection fees on meat from animals that had been
slaughtered more than 100 miles from the place of sale.  We
concluded that the statute violated the Commerce Clause
even though it burdened Virginia producers as well as the
Illinois litigant before the Court.  We explained:
-[T]his statute [cannot] be brought into harmony with
the Constitution by the circumstance that it purports
to apply alike to the citizens of all the States, including
Virginia; for, `a burden imposed by a State upon
interstate commerce is not to be sustained simply
because the statute imposing it applies alike to the
people of all the States, including the people of the
State enacting such statute.'  Minnesota v. Barber, [136
U. S. 313 (1890)]; Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District,
120 U. S. 489, 497.  If the object of Virginia had been
to obstruct the bringing into that State, for use as
human food, of all beef, veal and mutton, however
wholesome, from animals slaughtered in distant States,
that object will be accomplished if the statute before us
be enforced.-  Id., at 82-83.
  In Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349 (1951),
another Illinois litigant challenged a city ordinance that
made it unlawful to sell any milk as pasteurized unless it
had been processed at a plant -within a radius of five miles
from the central square of Madison,- id., at 350.  We held
the ordinance invalid, explaining:
-[T]his regulation, like the provision invalidated in
Baldwin v. Seelig, Inc., [294 U. S. 511 (1935)], in
practical effect excludes from distribution in Madison
wholesome milk produced and pasteurized in Illinois.
`The importer . . . may keep his milk or drink it, but
sell it he may not.'  Id., at 521.  In thus erecting an
economic barrier protecting a major local industry
against competition from without the State, Madison
plainly discriminates against interstate commerce.-
Id., at 354.
The fact that the ordinance also discriminated against all
Wisconsin producers whose facilities were more than five
miles from the center of the city did not mitigate its burden
on interstate commerce.  As we noted, it was -immaterial
that Wisconsin milk from outside the Madison area is
subjected to the same proscription as that moving in
interstate commerce.-  Id., at 354, n. 4.
  Nor does the fact that the Michigan statute allows
individual counties to accept solid waste from out of state
qualify its discriminatory character.  In the New Jersey case
the statute authorized a state agency to promulgate
regulations permitting certain categories of waste to enter
the State.  See 437 U. S., at 618-619.  The limited excep-
tion covered by those regulations-like the fact that several
Michigan counties accept out-of-state waste-merely
reduced the scope of the discrimination; for all categories of
waste not excepted by the regulations, the discriminatory
ban remained in place.  Similarly, in this case St. Clair
County's total ban on out-of-state waste is unaffected by the
fact that some other counties have adopted a different
policy.
  In short, neither the fact that the Michigan statute
purports to regulate intercounty commerce in waste nor the
fact that some Michigan counties accept out-of-state waste
provides an adequate basis for distinguishing this case from
Philadelphia v. New Jersey.
                           IV
  Michigan and St. Clair County also argue that this case
is different from Philadelphia v. New Jersey because the
SWMA constitutes a comprehensive health and safety
regulation rather than -economic protectionism- of the
State's limited landfill capacity.  Relying on an excerpt from
our opinion in Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U. S. 941 (1982),
they contend that the differential treatment of out-of-state
waste is reasonable because they have taken measures to
conserve their landfill capacity and the SWMA is necessary
to protect the health of their citizens.  That reliance is
misplaced.  In the Sporhase case we considered the consti-
tutionality of a Nebraska statute that prohibited the
withdrawal of ground water for use in an adjoining State
without a permit that could only issue if four conditions
were satisfied.  We held that the fourth condition-a
requirement that the adjoining State grant reciprocal rights
to withdraw its water and allow its use in Neb-
raska-violated the Commerce Clause.  Id., at 957-958.
  As a preface to that holding, we identified several reasons
that, in combination, justified the conclusion that the other
conditions were facially valid.  Id., at 957.  First, we
questioned whether the statute actually discriminated
against interstate commerce.  Although the restrictive
conditions in the statute nominally applied only to inter-
state transfers of ground water, they might have been -no
more strict in application than [other state law] limitations
upon intrastate transfers.-  Id., at 956.  -Obviously, a State
that imposes severe withdrawal and use restrictions on its
own citizens is not discriminating against interstate
commerce when it seeks to prevent the uncontrolled
transfer of water out of the State.-  Id., at 955-956.
  We further explained that a confluence of factors could
justify a State's efforts to conserve and preserve ground
water for its own citizens in times of severe shortage.
Only the first of those reasons-our reference to the well-
recognized difference between economic protectionism, on
the one hand, and health and safety regulation, on the
other-is even arguably relevant to this case.  We may
assume that all of the provisions of Michigan's SWMA prior
to the 1988 amendments adding the Waste Import Restric-
tions could fairly be characterized as health and safety
regulations with no protectionist purpose, but we cannot
make that same assumption with respect to the Waste
Import Restrictions themselves.  Because those provisions
unambiguously discriminate against interstate commerce,
the State bears the burden of proving that they further
health and safety concerns that cannot be adequately
served by nondiscriminatory alternatives.  Michigan and St.
Clair County have not met this burden.
  Michigan and St. Clair County assert that the Waste
Import Restrictions are necessary because they enable
individual counties to make adequate plans for the safe
disposal of future waste.  Although accurate forecasts
about the volume and composition of future waste flows
may be an indispensable part of a comprehensive waste
disposal plan, Michigan could attain that objective without
discriminating between in- and out-of-state waste.  Michi-
gan could, for example, limit the amount of waste that
landfill operators may accept each year.  See Philadelphia
v. New Jersey, 437 U. S., at 626.  There is, however, no
valid health and safety reason for limiting the amount of
waste that a landfill operator may accept from outside the
State, but not the amount that the operator may accept
from inside the State.
  Of course, our conclusion would be different if the
imported waste raised health or other concerns not present-
ed by Michigan waste.  In Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131
(1986), for example, we upheld the State's prohibition
against the importation of live baitfish because parasites
and other characteristics of nonnative species posed a
serious threat to native fish that could not be avoided by
available inspection techniques.  We concluded:
-The evidence in this case amply supports the District
Court's findings that Maine's ban on the importation of
live baitfish serves legitimate local purposes that could
not adequately be served by available nondiscriminato-
ry alternatives.  This is not a case of arbitrary discrimi-
nation against interstate commerce; the record suggests
that Maine has legitimate reasons, `apart from their
origin, to treat [out-of-state baitfish] differently,'
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S., at 627.-  477
U. S., at 151-152.
In this case, in contrast, the lower courts did not find-and
respondents have not provided-any legitimate reason for
allowing petitioner to accept waste from inside the county
but not waste from outside the county.
  For the foregoing reasons, the Waste Import Restrictions
unambiguously discriminate against interstate commerce
and are appropriately characterized as protectionist
measures that cannot withstand scrutiny under the
Commerce Clause.  The judgment of the Court of Appeals
is therefore reversed.

                                      It is so ordered.